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James Russell offers an insightful analysis of the role of agency and executive 
functioning in cognitive development. In particular, I am quite sympathetic to his view 
concerning the nature of R-negation and its crucial role in the development of a first-
person experience of agency. I also agree with him that although this experience of 
agency is necessary for normal mental development, certain types of representational 
abilities, including symbolic capacities, are also needed.  
Russell devotes part of his paper to characterizing the kinds of action-monitoring 
mechanisms that might underpin R-negation and showing how disruptions of these 
mechanisms could explain certain aspects of schizophrenia and certain core features of 
autism. I have some reservations about certain aspects of his analysis. In particular, 
Russell argues that executive difficulties in both autism and schizophrenia are likely to 
be due to impairments of action monitoring at "a fairly high level". I think there is room 
for some 'intermediate' level of action-monitoring in between the higher and lower 
levels he distinguishes and that impairments at this intermediate level may play an 
important role in explaining some of the difficulties encountered by both schizophrenic 
patients and subjects with autism.  
At the lower-level of action monitoring Russell stresses the role played by 
efference copying mechanisms and by forward models. They make it possible for 
creatures to distinguish perceptual changes brought by their own movements from those 
caused by environmental changes and they allow predictions to be made about the 
results of certain actions in advance of making them. This latter feature is necessary for 
actions to be minimally intentional. Yet, both those mechanisms operate at subpersonal 
levels and the representations they operate on (motor commands, predictions) are 
normally non-conscious. Thus, they are not enough to ensure that its actions be 
intentional for the creature itself. For this to be achieved, a higher-level of action 
monitoring is needed. Here, Russell's follows Frith's suggestion that higher-level 
intentions and thoughts expressed in inner speech are themselves efference-copied and 
that the copies made are matched against results. Russell also accepts Frith's hypothesis 
that perturbations of these higher-level mechanisms of intention-monitoring may 
account for the fact that schizophrenics confuse their own and others actions and he 
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further suggests that the action monitoring difficulties in autism are also likely to 
involve the monitoring of high-level intentions. 
Although I don't deny that both schizophrenic patients and subjects with autism 
may have difficulties keeping track of their intentions, I don't think this should be 
blamed primarily on a defective intention-monitoring system as characterized by Frith. 
So what alternative do I suggest? Let me briefly return to forward models and introduce 
the notion of intermediate action monitoring. Forward models, as described in 
Jeannerod (1997), are hierarchically organized sets of motor representations, with 
representations at the higher-level encoding relatively global specifications concerning 
the action, and representations at lower levels encoding subactions in more detailed 
ways. Forward models also involve comparison mechanisms testing the degree of match 
between the desired and the current state of the system and operating in parallel at all 
levels of processing. Jeannerod also contends that, although the process of motor 
representation is largely non-conscious, the content of at least the higher levels of motor 
representations can be accessed consciously in certain conditions. These conditions 
include execution being accidentally blocked or delayed, as well as attention being 
voluntarily directed to those representations. My suggestion is that by thus accessing 
certain aspects of their motor representations, agents are capable of some intermediate 
form of action monitoring. At this level, the comparison operates not between the high-
level intention and the resulting action, but between certain aspects of a motor 
representation and the resulting action.  
In Daprati et al. (1997) study, where subjects were asked to judge whether what 
they saw on a TV-screen while performing a simple hand movement was their own hand 
or an alien hand, schizophrenics patients were only specifically impaired in the 
condition where what they saw was an alien hand performing the same movement. If, as 
Russell contends, their problem were with higher-level intention monitoring, they 
should also have been impaired in discriminating their own hand from the alien hand 
performing a different action. In order to make the correct judgement in the difficult 
'experiment-same' condition, the subjects had to pay attention to slight differences in 
timing and kinematic patterns between their internal motor representations and that 
perceived by perceptual channels. Since these fine-grained temporal and kinematic 
aspects of the actions are presumably not encoded in the content of high-level 
intentions, what is needed to succeed at the task and is, I suggest, impaired in 
schizophrenic patients is intermediate action-monitoring, that is a capacity to 
appropriately shift the cognitive focus to internal motor representations.  
Similarly, an appeal to intermediate action-monitoring may help fill what 
otherwise appears to be a gap in Russell's account of the impairments of children with 
autism. Russell claims that if children are to develop a theory of mind, it is necessary 
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that they enjoy the right kind of pre-theoretical experience of their own mentality, where 
this involves being capable of intention-monitoring. Intention-monitoring is in turn said 
to depend on the development of symbolic functioning that enables the child to regulate 
his or her behaviour in terms of symbolically-encoded goals. This latter ability is what, 
according to Russell, fails to develop in autism. Now, even if we agree that the 
development of symbolic function cannot be the result of mere bootstrapping and thus 
posit an innate symbolic capacity that makes language-learning possible, we still need to 
solve the symbol-grounding problem. In order for representational contents to be 
attached to sounds, the representational contents have to be independently available. 
What is needed for the semantic anchoring of words having to do with actions and goals 
is the availability of motor representations (Pacherie, 1998). Lower-level action 
monitoring operates at sub-personal levels and will not provide the necessary anchors, 
whereas appealing to intention-monitoring would make the account circular. So, what 
remains to do the trick is intermediate action monitoring that makes available at least 
part of the content of motor representations.  
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